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THE MINISTERIAL DRAFT EXEMPTION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Ministers and divinity students enjoy a special exemption from
the military draft.' The exemption is generally granted where a rel-
atively large amount of time is spent in the preaching and teaching of
religion,2 or where a student makes a reasonably convincing showing
that he is studying full time in preparation for the ministry. The
number of young men who rely on the exemption is significant.4
I Selective Service Act of 1948, § 6(g), 62 Stat. 611, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964):
Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion . . . and students preparing
for the ministry under the direction of recognized churches or religious organiza-
tions, who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction in recognized
theological or divinity schools, or who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses
of instruction leading to their entrance into recognized theological or divinity
schools in which they have been preenrolled, shall be exempt from training and
service (but not from registration) under this title.
Id. § 16(g), 62 Stat. at 624-25, 50 U.S.C. App. at § 466(g):
(1) The term "duly ordained minister of religion" means a person who has
been ordained, in accordance with the ceremonial [sic], ritual, or discipline of a
church, religious sect, or organization established on the basis of a community of
faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character, to preach and to
teach the doctrines of such church, sect, or organization and to administer the
rites and ceremonies thereof in public worship, and who as his regular and cus-
tomary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion and administers
the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of such
church, sect, or organization.
(2) The term "regular minister of religion" means one who as his customary
vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, a religious
sect, or organization of which he is a member, without having been formally
ordained as a minister of religion, and who is recognized by such church, sect, or
organization as a regular minister.
(3) The term "regular or duly ordained minister of religion" does not in-
ciude a person who irregularly or incidentally preaches and teaches the principles
of religion of a church, religious sect, or organization and does not include any
person who may have been duly ordained a minister, in accordance with the
ceremonial [sic], rite, or discipline of a church, religious sect or organization, but
who does not regularly, as a vocation, teach and preach the principles of religion
and administer the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or prin-
ciples of his church, sect, or organization.
The exemption is untouched by recent draft reform. Selective Service Amendment
Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 220; Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19019 (1969).
2 E.g., Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); United States v. Jones, 382
F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Hurt, 244 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1957); Hacker v.
United States, 215 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1954).
3 E.g., United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953); United States
v. Bartelt, 200 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1952); United States ex rel. Levy v. Cain, 149 F.2d 338
(2d Cir. 1945).
4 As of June 30, 1967, 101,474 men were classified IV-D, the classification of the
ministerial exemption. This constituted approximately 0.3% of all living registrants
(inciuding those over the age of liability). 1967 ANNUAL REzPoRT OF THE DiRcroR OF
SELF'ivE SERvicE 70.
MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION
The exemption originated in the draft law of 19175 and has been
retained in each subsequent draft statute with only minor variations.
The legislative purpose for the exemption is not clear, although it
probably involved deference to both the spiritual needs of the people
and the inherently peaceful nature of the ministry.7
The preference granted to men choosing to do religious work may
violate the establishment clause of the first amendment." Past chal-
lenges of the exemption on establishment clause grounds have failed,
but not so convincingly as to preclude further argument. In the Selec-
tive Draft Law Cases,9 the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the
establishment clause objection to the 1917 Act'0 by saying that its un-
soundness was too apparent to require explanation." When next made,
more than fifty years later, the argument was again rejected in a
district court decision 12 resting on the Selective Draft Law Cases, on a
presumption of validity stemming from the subsequent reenactment
of the exemption, and on the principle that Congress could exempt any
5 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78:
[R]egular or duly ordained ministers of religion, students who at the time of the
approval of this Act are preparing for the ministry in recognized theological or
divinity schools ... shall be exempt from the selective draft herein prescribed ....
6 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(d), 54 Stat. 888, provided:
Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, and students who are preparing
for the ministry in theological or divinity schools recognized as such for more
than one year prior to the date of enactment of this Act, shall be exempt from
training and service (but not from registration) under this Act.
The Selective Service Act of 1948, §§ 6(g), 16(g), ch. 625, 62 Stat. 609, 624, included
the exemption as it now reads.
7 Cornell, Exemption from the Draft: A Study in Civil Liberties, 56 YALE L. J. 258,
263 (1947). One frequently quoted exchange in the House of Representatives in 1917
gives at least one man's view of the purpose of the exemption:
Mr. BLACK. Does the gentleman know any reason why a minister of the
Gospel should be excepted any more than a lawyer or a banker or a farmer?
Mr. QUIN. Oh, yes; a minister of the Gospel ministers to the people. We need
somebody, while we are following this war-mad cry, while we are resorting to
every endeavor to break down Prussianism, we need somebody inspired by God on
high to preach to our women and children and those men above 25 years of
age who are left at home to enjoy their usual pursuits. [Laughter]. Do not take
the ministers of the Gospel from them. Leave a semblance of the followers of the
lowly Nazarene back at home to preach to the people, to bury the dead, and
marry the youth of the land.
55 CoNG. REc. 983 (1917). Earlier, Representative Quin had stated, "Surely it would be
humiliating to have the agents of the War Department drag the minister of God away
from his congregation and conscript him into the Army." Id.
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ..... U.S.
CoNsr. amend. I.
9 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
10 Note 5 supra.
11 245 U.S. at 390.
12 United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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group as part of a design "to minimize the disruptive force of the
statute upon the national well-being."' 3 These cases cannot be accepted
as conclusive, for the half century since the Selective Draft Law Cases
has witnessed a virtual rebirth of the establishment clause.
I
THE DEMANDS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has considered the establishment clause in
a series of cases beginning with its 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of
Education.14 Although the clause's scope is still somewhat unclear,
two principal tests of an "establishment" have been formulated. Com-
bined with the remainder of the relevant case law, these tests impose
an overriding requirement of governmental neutrality.
The first test is the strict separation or no-aid principle announced
in Everson.15 There, the Court stated that neither state nor federal
government "can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another," and concluded that the establishment
clause was intended to create, in Jefferson's words, "'a wall of separation
between church and State.' "16 A dissenting opinion representing the
views of four Justices agreed with the separation principle and em-
phatically stated that the object of the establishment clause "was to
create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form
13 Id. at 232.
14 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state-financed transportation for parochial school children
upheld). Despite its prominent place in the Bill of Rights, the establishment clause was
largely ignored by the Court until Everson. The cases subsequent to Everson are:
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (on-premises released-time program
struck down); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (off-premises released-time program
upheld); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws upheld); Two
Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (same); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961) (required affirmation of belief in God as prerequisite for holding public office
struck down); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state-composed school prayer struck
down); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public schools
struck down); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state program to provide
textbooks to parochial school children upheld).
15 See P. KAtPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrruTION 61 (1964).
16 330 U.S. at 15-16. Though arguably dictum, since the challenged program was
upheld, the passage from which the quotation is taken has become a standard, quoted
with approval in five subsequent major cases: Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
242 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins; 367
U.S. 488, 493-94 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US. 420, 443 (1961); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
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of public aid or support for religion." 17 This "wall of separation"
principle was affirmed in McCollum v. Board of Education,' the next
establishment clause case.
Subjected to this demanding test, the ministerial exemption fails.
The Selective Service Act singles out ministers of religion for preferred
treatment.1" In so doing the Act gives twofold aid-individual and in-
stitutional-to religion. Solely because they preach or study religion,
some young men are relieved of a duty imposed on others engaged in
non-religious work. Religious groups are therefore given the benefit of
the uninterrupted service of their personnel, a benefit not granted to
non-religious organizations. Although not financial, this is aid in a
very real sense, both to those who choose to practice religion profes-
sionally and to the religious groups and beliefs they serve.20
The other test is propounded in School District v. Schemrpp,21 a
1963 case invalidating Bible reading in the public schools. Citing
Everson as authority, the Court crystallized its test:
[What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.22
Although it is unclear what effect dual purposes, secular and religious,
would have, it seems reasonable that a predominantly religious purpose
would violate the test.23 At any rate, both the purpose and the primary
effect of legislation must be secular for it to be valid.
There is no readily apparent secular purpose for the ministerial
exemption.2 4 Its most probable purpose is to free religious professionals
and organizations from any hardships the draft might impose and to
17 330 U.S. at 31-32, quoted with approval in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203,
217 (1963). Since the Everson majority upheld the challenged program, the four dissenters
were advocating an even stronger separation doctrine than that applied by the majority.
18 333 US. 203 (1948).
19 Note I supra.
20 The no-aid principle is not limited to financial aid. "The prohibition broadly
forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form or degree." Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
21 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
22 Id. at 222.
23 See id. at 223-24.
24 Concern for free exercise of religion may have been a legislative purpose, but it
does not justify the exemption. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra.
1970]
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avoid having to force clergymen to fight.25 So viewed, the exemption is
clearly religious. The exemption might have been prompted by a
concern for the spiritual needs of the people. Spiritual needs, however,
are inseparable from religious needs, and such a concern therefore
evidences a religious purpose.26 Congress may have been motivated by
a belief that the exemption would enhance homefront morale in time
of war and generally benefit the well-being of the people. An argument
of this type, however, was rejected in Schempp.27 Although seeking to
strengthen the nation's military efforts might be classified under the
secular purpose of national defense, the use of an essentially religious
means to effectuate it is impermissible. The government cannot aid
religion as a means of furthering purportedly secular ends.28 Therefore,
even if a secular purpose can be found, the ministerial exemption may
be an invalid way of effecting it.
The primary effect of the exemption is to aid religion at both
the personal level and the institutional level.29 In view of the number
of men relying on the exemption, it is not an insubstantial aid.30
If there is any secular effect, it is not primary, as required by the
25 See note 7 supra. Congress intended, however, that the exemption be a narrow
one, limited to the leaders of religious groups and not available to those claiming to
be ministers merely by virtue of membership in a sect. S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1948); see Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 394 (1953).
26 Some legislators have openly recognized the exemption as an aid to religion. In
discussing the exemption as part of the 1940 Act, Senator Maloney said:
Here in the United States . . . we should make every effort not only to preserve
religion but to extend it. No people can have too much religion, regardless of the
faith they profess; and if religion should fail here in any degree my hope would
be lessened.
86 CoNG. Rac. 9851 (1940).
27 There the Court refused to uphold a religious means (Bible reading) to accomplish
purposes that the state claimed to be secular-"the promotion of moral values, the con-
tradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions
and the teaching of literature." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
28 The government may not
by any device, support belief or the expression of belief for its own sake, whether
from conviction of the truth of that belief, or from conviction that by the propa-
gation of that belief the civil welfare of the State is served.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Mr. Justice
Brennan, concurring, took a narrower view in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203,
231 (1963): "[T]he Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious with secular
institutions which . . . use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends
where secular means would suffice." There is no indication that homefront morale cannot
be preserved without the ministerial exemption since a large proportion of ministers are
beyond draft age.
29 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
30 Note 4 supra.
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Schempp test, but rather derivative from, and dependent on, the ad-
vancement of religion.31
The Everson and Schempp tests combine with the other estab-
lishment clause cases to yield the fundamental principle of the clause
as construed by the Supreme Court-the principle of government neu-
trality. There is considerable difference of opinion, both within the
Court itselW2 and among commentators,3 3 regarding the definition of
this principle. Its basic meaning, however, is dear: (1) there can be no
discrimination among religions or sects; 34 (2) there can be no purposeful
preference of religion over non-religion, and no purposeful aid to
religion in general; 35 and (3) any aid to or hindrance of religion must
be an incidental effect of the government's pursuit of legitimate sec-
ular ends.36
31 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, although writing before Schempp, clarified the concept of
primary effect:
If the primary end achieved by a form of regulation is the affirmation or promo-
tion of religious doctrine-primary, in the sense that all secular ends which it
purportedly serves are derivative from, not wholly independent of, the advance-
ment of religion-the regulation is beyond the power of the state.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (concurring opinion). It is difficult to
bring any secular end purportedly served by the exemption within the requirement of
being independent of the advancement of religion. To the extent it is furthered at all
(see note 28 supra), homefront morale, the most probable secular effect, could only be
furthered derivatively, through the grant to religion of preferred treatment. If, on the
other hand, the term "primary" is taken to mean "most important," the exemption's
primary effect is still most probably to aid religion. Aid to religion is immediate and
dear, while any secular effect is remote and hypothetical.
32 See, e.g., the five opinions in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
33 See W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CoNSTITuTIoNs 12-13 (1964); P. KAUPER, supra
note 15, at 64-67; P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 16-18 (1962); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE AND FREEDOm 178-80 (rev. ed. 1967); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HAxv. L. REV. 513,
516-22 (1968).
34 "Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion
... or prefer one religion over another." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947);
accord, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
35 "Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which . . . aid all
religions .... " Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). In the Schempp case, Mr.
Justice Clark declared that "this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another."
374 U.S. at 216.
36 This principle is best illustrated in the Sunday dosing law cases. Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). McGowan
emphasized the secular purposes of the Sunday closing laws and asserted that "the 'Estab-
lishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." 366 U.S.




The ministerial exemption results in discrimination among reli-
gious sects. Ministers of the more orthodox sects generally have little
trouble in obtaining draft exemptions, while those serving sects relying
on a lay or volunteer ministry often encounter difficulty. 7 A lay
ministry, such as that of the Jehovah's Witnesses, consists of all the
members of the sect, who devote varying amounts of time to door-to-
door preaching but must spend relatively large amounts of time in
secular work to earn a livelihood. Although exemption is generally
granted to those with a high ratio of religious time to secular time a8
a considerable percentage of such a sect's ministerial force is not ex-
empted.3 9 More conventional sects, such as the Methodists and Roman
Catholics, on the other hand, enjoy the services of a ministerial force
untouched by the draft.40 A differentiation also affects young men
preparing for the ministry in the manner prescribed by their sect
but not attending a "recognized" divinity school.41 Although the statute
has been held not to impose a test of orthodoxy,42 it nevertheless dis-
advantages unorthodox sects. Again, the effect is a dual one, felt at
both individual and institutional levels.
Of the many interpretations of the neutrality principle that have
been offered, two seem especially relevant. One commentator dubs the
controlling principle "political neutrality," asserting that its thrust is
that religious activities and groups should not be excluded from schemes
.of governmental regulation simply because they are religious, and that
religious groups should be in a position of political equality with other
37 The bulk of the litigation concerning the exemption has involved Jehovah's
Witnesses, who rely on a volunteer ministry. Since all members of the sect claim to be
ministers, the courts have based their decisions on the amount of time spent in religious
activities, often as compared to time spent in secular work. See, e.g., Dickinson v. United
States, 846 U.S. 389 (1953); United States v. Jones, 382 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Hurt, 244 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1957); Hacker v. United States, 215 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1954). In this way the courts separate those who do religious work as a "vocation" from
those who do such work only "irregularly or incidentally." 50 U.S.C. App. § 4 6 6 (g) (1964).
38 Dickinson v. United States, 846 U.S. 389, 394 (1953).
39 Regarding the role of prejudice, see Comment, Ministerial Exemption from Selec-
tive Service System, 19 SYvtacusE L. Rv. 996 (1968).
40 Unfairness in this different treatment was recognized by Justices Black and Douglas,
who favored extending the exemption to all persons recognized as ministers by their
sects, regardless of the amount of time spent in religious work. Cox v. United States, 382
U.S. 442, 455-57 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (1964). See, e.g., Tyrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 .U.S. 910 (1952). For an analysis of how the lack of uniform
standards results in discrimination, see Comment, Discrimination Caused by Lack of
Standards in Student Ministerial Draft Classifications, 1969 UTAH L. Ray. 239.
42 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 395 (1953).
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groups.43 The ministerial draft exemption places religious groups in a
preferred position over non-religious groups rather than in a position
of political equality. Another writer contends that the free exercise
and establishment clauses read together prohibit any classification on
the basis of religion for purposes of governmental action.44 Clearly,
the exemption classifies men on the basis of their religious activities
for purposes of draft treatment. Neutrality, however conceived, must
mean that the government cannot favor individuals or groups merely
because of their religious activities.
45
The principle of neutrality prohibits governmental hostility to
religion.46 Denial of the ministerial exemption would not constitute
hostility, but would only subject religions and religious professionals
to the same burdens as non-religious groups and individuals. Any
negative effect on religion would be an incidental one, stemming from
the secular purpose of raising military manpower, with no dispropor-
tionate burden falling on religion or religious groups.
In some situations preferred treatment for religious groups may
be required or justified by the free exercise clause.47 Some suggest that
the ministerial exemption is so justified,48 but this position is unsup-
portable. Subjecting ministers and divinity students to the draft would
not deny their free exercise of religion; they would be free to practice
43 Giannella, supra note 3, at 519-20.
44 P. KURLAND, supra note 33, at 18.
45 Other theories of neutrality, though not uniform in their positions, generally
indicate that the exemption should be seriously questioned. See authority cited in note
33 supra.
46 [The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
47 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
48 Mr. Justice Brennan, in discussing the possibility that the free exercise clause might
sometimes validate practices otherwise barred by the establishment clause, has suggested
that free exercise considerations might support the ministerial exemption, and that
"hostility, not neutrality, would characterize . . . the withholding of draft exemptions
for ministers and conscientious objectors." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963)
(concurring opinion).
In 1940 one Senator contended that
such an exemption is necessary. Religion, of necessity, must have a place of
importance in a democracy, and the function of a democratic government is to
encourage in every way possible the free exercise of religion. It is obvious and
beyond argument that to subject ministers of religion to compulsory military
training is to seriously interfere with, if not completely to suspend, this right.
86 CONG. Rrc. 10293 (1940).
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their religion to the same extent as all other inductees, and would
even be free to preach and teach their faith, either informally or
through the chaplaincy. Upon termination of their military service, they
could resume their professional religious work. If they were religiously
opposed to participation in war, they would have the full benefit of
the special provisions available for conscientious objectors.49 Nor would
elimination of the ministerial exemption infringe the free exercise
rights of church members. A large percentage of clergymen is certainly
beyond draft age, and the absence of younger ministers for military
reasons would only be temporary. The loss of manpower would thus
not be crippling. Congregations would be free to carry on their reli-
gious activities, subject only to the same disadvantage faced by all
non-religious groups and organizations.
II
HARMONIZING THE CONFUSING PRECEDENTS
The establishment clause cases have a common theoretical founda-
tion, but the actual decisions may cause confusion; four of the eight
major cases have upheld the challenged governmental action.50 Three
of these cases are easily reconciled with the thesis that the establishment
clause invalidates the ministerial draft exemption. Everson v. Board of
Education51 upheld a program under which public school boards re-
imbursed parents, including those whose children attended parochial
schools, for the cost of their children's bus transportation to school.
The Court, after announcing the strict separation principle, upheld the
program on the basis of the child benefit theory: individual members
of religious groups may not, because of their faith or lack of it, be
excluded from receiving the benefits of general public welfare legis-
49 50 US.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. IV, 1969). That some ministers would obtain
conscientious objector status does not mean that eliminating the ministerial exemption
would be without practical effect. Conscientious objectors are required to contribute
noncombatant or civilian service to meet their military obligation. Also, many ministers
would not qualify as conscientious objectors and would thus face the same service as other
men. See note 65 infra.
50 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state-provided textbooks for parochial
school children); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 206 (1952) (released-time program for off-school religious education);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state-financed transportation for parochial
school children). See also Gallagher v. Grown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961)
(Sunday dosing laws); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961)y(Sunday closing laws).
51 830 U.S. 1 (1947).
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lation.52 Such reasoning is inapplicable to the draft exemption; rather
than including individuals in a general welfare scheme 53 without re-
gard to religion, the exemption relieves certain individuals from a
general obligation solely because of their religious activities. Such a
direct preference is clearly distinguishable from the kind of incidental
benefit allowed in Everson. McGowan v. Maryland,54 which upheld
Sunday closing laws, and Board of Education v. Allen,55 which upheld
the loaning of books to parochial school children, are similarly dis-
tinguishable. Using an approach similar to the one taken in Schempp,
the Court found secular purposes and primary effects, with any effects
on religion being only incidental. 56 The ministerial exemption fails to
meet these standards.
The decision most difficult to reconcile is Zorach v. Clauson,57
which bears a superficial factual resemblance to the draft exemption.
There, the Court upheld the release of public school children during
the school day to attend religious classes in local churches. As with
the draft exemption, individuals were released from a duty imposed
on others in order to spend time engaged in religious activity. On the
basis of this similarity, Zorach arguably controls the question of
whether the exemption is constitutional. Such a conclusion, however,
is ill-founded; there are three principal reasons why Zorach should not
control.
First, the factual differences between the two situaiions are crucial.
Although perhaps alike in principle, there is a great difference in degree
between the release of a child from one hour of school per week and
the complete release of a young man from a two-year military obliga-
tion. The former may be dismissed as insubstantial, but the latter
may not. Nor is the difference entirely one of degree. One of the
52 Id. at 16. The rationale included a concern for safeguarding free exercise. Id.
53 It has consistently been held that there is no constitutional right to exemption
from the draft, and that any exemptions granted are matters of legislative grace. See
Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 394 (1954); Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1969); United States v. Mohammed, 288 F.2d 236
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
54 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
55 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
56 The McGowan Court recognized the continuing possibility of violating the estab-
lishment clause:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the "Estab-
lishment" Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced either on
the fact of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its
operative effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion.
366 U.S. at 453.
57 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
1970]
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Court's main arguments in Zorach was that since a teacher could excuse
an individual from school on a particular occasion to attend a religious
activity, there was no reason why an organized system of release should
be invalid 58 This reasoning cannot be applied to the ministerial
exemption, for there is no comparable possibility of individual release
from military service to engage in religious activity. In addition, the
Zorach Court's characterization of the program in question was that
of a government institution adjusting its operating schedule in defer-
ence to the religious interests of the people.5 9 Relieving ministers from
military liability is not an adjustment of a schedule; rather, it is an
unwarranted use of governmental power to favor religion.
Another reason why Zorach should not control is the presence of
a policy in the selective service system that was not a factor in Zorach
-fairness and equality of treatment. This concern for fairness is
epitomized by the recent institution of the lottery system of draft
selection.60 Equality and fairness are not achieved by exempting reli-
gious professionals and students from the draft while practitioners and
students of other professions are subject to call.
Finally, reliance on Zorach is unconvincing because of its relative
weakness as a precedent. Although the case has not been overruled,
the Court's reasoning is neither clear nor sound. One of the Court's
justifications for its decision was that to strike down the challenged
program would be to show hostility to religion, an assertion that the
Court purported to substantiate by exaggerated and misleading ex-
amples. 61 The real basis of the decision was pragmatic-a reluctance,
based on the notion that some accommodation is permissible, to become
constitutionally involved in relatively harmless school programs and
58 Id. at 313. The Court felt, perhaps on free-exercise grounds, that it would be
undesirable to prohibit individual release. Id. at 314.
59 Id. at 314-15.
[W]e cannot expand [McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released-
time program of in-school religious education held invalid)] to cover the present
released time program unless separation of Church and State means that public
institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules to accommodate the
religious needs of the people.
Id. at 315.
60 The draft lottery system, designed to further equality and fairness of treatment by
means of random selection during a limited period of liability, was put into effect on
Nov. 26, 1969, by Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19019. The change was made possible
by the Selective Service Amendment Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 220.
61 The Court expressed fear, inter alia, that "[m]unidpalities would not be permitted
to render police or fire protection to religious groups," and "[p]olicemen who helped
parishioners to their places of worship would violate the Constitution." 343 U.S. at 312.
Reliance on such exaggerations is unsound, since they could be realized only if religious
groups were denied benefits generally conferred on all others, an occurrence repugnant to
neutrality and specifically contrary to Everson. See text at notes 51-52 supra.
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similar situations. 2 Because of this basis, Zorach has not been heavily
relied on in later cases. Rather, later cases, especially Schempp, have re-
asserted the neutrality principle and extended its application. 5 Zorach,
though a part of establishment clause law, is a relatively small part.64
It is not sufficient to save the ministerial exemption from its conflict
with the rest of the case law.
CONCLUSION
The ministerial draft exemption is both unfair and unconstitu-
tional. Its unfairness has even been recognized publicly by religious
groups calling for its abolition. 5 More important, the exemption vio-
lates the principles of the establishment clause. The governmental
action involved is sufficiently analogous to that dealt with in the
existing cases06 that it should be subject to the same constitutional
limitations. 7
Jack L. Smith
62 343 U.S. at 312-13. See P. KAUPER, supra note 15, at 70. Minimal accommodation
may even be required by the free exercise clause.
03 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
64 "Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the
judicial process than to students of constitutional law." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Zorach was only a temporary retreat from Everson and
McCollum. L. PFFPER, supra note 33, at 177.
65 At a recent Senate hearing, William P. Thompson, speaking as Stated Clerk of the
General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, said:
Finally, I would raise the question of the propriety of the Selective Service
IV-D exemption classification for ordained clergy and ministerial students. The
175th General Assembly ... recognized this problem and recommended that min-
isters and ministerial students accept their responsibilities as citizens for the de-
fense and security of the Nation through voluntary service as military chaplains
or by submitting themselves to the provisions of the Selective Service System.
Hearings on S. 1432 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
373 (1967). The North American Area Council of the World Alliance of the Presbyterian,
and Reformed Churches, with only United States churches voting, adopted the following
resolution on January 11, 1967:
At the present time the United States Selective Service Act of 1951 provides
automatic draft exemption for ordained Clergy and students for the ministry.
Instead of this exemption, the North American Area Council recommends that
clergy and candidates for the ministry be treated similarly to all professional
personnel.
Id. at 373-74.
66 The Supreme Court has often expressed its principles in broad, absolute terms
instead of narrower ones that would have been sufficient for each case. See, e.g., School
Dist. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947).
67 Standing to assert establishment clause d'ims has been allowed with increasing
liberality. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), with Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
